The University of Notre Dame
Australia Law Review
Volume 19

Article 6

1-12-2017

The Interest is Not Mutual: Effect of the Personal Property Securities Act
2009 (CTH) on Contractual Rights of Set-Off
Caroline Woo
contact@carolinewoo.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/undalr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Woo, Caroline (2017) "The Interest is Not Mutual: Effect of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (CTH) on Contractual Rights of
Set-Off," The University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review: Vol. 19 , Article 6.
Available at: https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/undalr/vol19/iss1/6

This Case Note is brought to you by ResearchOnline@ND. It has
been accepted for inclusion in The University of Notre Dame
Australia Law Review by an authorized administrator of
ResearchOnline@ND. For more information, please contact
researchonline@nd.edu.au.

THE INTEREST IS NOT MUTUAL: EFFECT OF THE PERSONAL
PROPERTY SECURITIES ACT 2009 (CTH) ON CONTRACTUAL
RIGHTS OF SET-OFF
CAROLINE WOO*
ABSTRACT
In Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (Receivers and Managers
Appointed), the Supreme Court of Western Australia held that the rights of ANZ, a secured creditor of
Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (Forge) holding a security interest under the Personal Property Securities
Act 2009 (Cth) (PPSA), trumped Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd’s rights of contractual and equitable set-off.
Forge is in receivership and in liquidation. In answering the preliminary issues in dispute between the
parties, the Supreme Court examined the complex interaction between contractual and equitable
rights, the PPSA and section 553C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the CA).

I INTRODUCTION
Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (Receivers and
Managers Appointed),1 concerned a dispute between Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd (Hamersley)
and Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (Forge). Hamersley and Forge were parties to engineering
contracts (Contracts), which included provisions governing payment and set-offs. Forge
became insolvent and was placed in receivership and liquidation. Hamersley sought to set-off
its claims against Forge, which were for a greater value than Forge’s claims against it, and to
prove for the balance in Forge’s liquidation. Forge’s case, however, was that its claims against
Hamersley were subject to a security interest under the PPSA and accordingly, Forge argued
that Hamersley was not entitled to set-off its claims and must pay the full amount it owed
Forge.

*Bachelor of Architecture, Bachelor of Laws (Hons), Grad Dip Construction Law, Registered Adjudicator (WA
and NT)
1Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) (Receivers and Managers Appointed)
[2017] WASC 152 (2 June 2017).
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Justice Tottle held that set-off was not available to Hamersley. Whilst the Contracts provided
for Hamersley to have a right to set-off its claims against monies it owed Forge, 2 Hamersley
was not able to rely on such rights because of section 553C of the Corporations Act 2001
(Cth) (CA). Section 553C operates as a code regulating set-offs between an insolvent
company and a person who wants to have a debt or claim admitted against that company and
it operates to the exclusion of equitable set-off and contractual set-off. 3 Nor could Hamersley
rely on the right of set-off provided for under section 553C since any mutuality of interest
between Forge’s claims and Hamersley’s claims ended when the security over Forge’s claims
was created in favour of ANZ.

II DID THE CONTRACTS PROVIDE FOR SET-OFF AND NETTING-OFF?
The first issue considered by Justice Tottle was whether clause 16 of the General Conditions
(GC) of the Contracts between Forge and Hamersley provided for a netting-off or set-off.
The clause sets out a three-step process for payments. Firstly, Forge was to submit monthly
progress claims. Secondly, Hamersley was to issue Forge with a Payment Certificate stating
its opinion of the money due from it to Forge pursuant to the monthly progress claim.
Thirdly, for Hamersley to make payment.4 Subclause 16.6 governed delayed payments and
subclause 16.12 provided that Hamersley may deduct from monies otherwise due to Forge
any debt or other monies due, and any claim to money which Hamersley may have against
Forge whether for damages (including liquidated damages) or otherwise, under or in
connection with the Contract. Hamersley did not exercise its rights pursuant to subclause
16.12 before the appointment of administrators.5
Hamersley’s case was that the payment terms amounted to, ‘…not so much a set-off but an
agreement that, in that event (that is, if Hamersley exercised its contractual rights), only a net
balance is due to or from Forge.’6 It contended that the reference to ‘monies otherwise due’ in
subclause 16.12 was to give a base from which the netting-off or off-setting contemplated by
2Ibid [405].
3Ibid [407].
4Ibid [126].
5Ibid [139].
6Ibid [130].
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the clause might be made.7 His Honour rejected Hamersley’s argument and held that
subclause 16.12 did not operate as a netting-off provision.8 Justice Tottle held that the
language employed in clauses 16.4(a), 16.5 and 16.12 was clear and did not support
Hamersley’s position. His Honour stated that on its true construction, clause 16
‘provides for amounts to be due and owing to Forge (debts) and cl 16.12 does not operate to convert
them into a base for ‘netting off’ such that the amounts were never in fact due because they were
subject to Hamersley’s rights of set-off’.9

It was however, clear that subclause 16.12 gave Hamersley an entitlement to set-off. This
raised the issue as to whether the right of equitable and contractual set-off is displaced by
section 553C of the CA.

III DOES S 553C DISPLACE THE OPERATION OF EQUITABLE AND CONTRACTUAL SET-OFF?
Section 553C of the CA deals with insolvent companies and with mutual credit and set-off. In
short, where section 553C operates, the original claims and cross-claims cease to exist and
are replaced by a balance. If that balance is in the creditor’s favour, the creditor may prove
for the amount of the balance in the winding up.10
Hamersley accepted that the authorities supported the proposition that if section 553C
applies, any contractual set-off inconsistent with section 553C would not operate. It argued,
however, that where section 553C is inapplicable, contractual set-off and equitable set-off
remained available. Justice Tottle rejected Hamersley’s contentions. His Honour held that
section 553C operates as an exclusive code that regulates set-off between an insolvent
company and a person who wants to have a debt or claim admitted against the company to
the exclusion of equitable set-off and contractual set-off. 11 His Honour reached this
conclusion on the bases of the following:

7Ibid [129]-[133].
8Ibid [136]-[143].
9Ibid [142] (emphasis added).
10Ibid [153]; citing GM & AM Pearce and Co Pty Ltd v RGM Australia Pty Ltd [1998] 4 VR 888 (Batt JA);
(1997) 143 FLR 1.
11Ibid [200], [210].
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(a) this conclusion is supported by the statutory text, that is, by the mandatory language
used in the provision;12
(b) the statutory context of section 553C, that is, the provision appears in a subdivision of
the CA which sets out a detailed set of rules to be applied in relation to proofs of debt
and claims evidencing a legislative intention that these provisions should regulate all
debts and claims between the company, its debtors and its creditors;13
(c) the finality of the process would be undermined if the party claiming to prove could
improve its position by relying on a set-off outside the section 553C regime;14
(d) the statutory purpose of section 553C and its predecessor provisions, which is to do
substantial justice between the company and its debtors and its creditors as a whole,
would be undermined if set-offs, whether equitable or contractual, that are not
confined by the limits of section 533C could be invoked;15
(e) there is persuasive support in the authorities that there can be no contracting out of
section 553C and, from this proposition, it is logical to conclude that the section
established a code and that there can be no reliance outside of that code on other
forms of set-off;16 and
(f) the weight of authority, particularly the judgment in Day v Dent,17 favours the view
that section 553C constitutes a code and that other forms of set-off cannot be relied
upon independently of the provision.18
Accordingly, contractual set-off and equitable set-off was not available to Hamersley. Any
right to set-off would only be available if section 553C of the CA applied.
The parties raised a number of further arguments in the event that section 553C was not held
to be an exclusive code. Whilst it was unnecessary for his Honour to do so, Justice Tottle
dealt with these arguments before addressing whether set-off pursuant to section 553C of the
CA was available to Hamersley.

12Ibid [211].
13Ibid [212].
14Ibid [213].
15Ibid [214].
16Ibid [215].
17Day v Dent [1981] FCA 37; (1981) 34 ALR 595.
18Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (in Liquidation) (Receivers and Managers Appointed)
[2017] WASC 152 (2 June 2017), [217]-[218].
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III ARE HAMERSLEY’S RIGHTS TO CONTRACTUAL SET OFF NONETHELESS PRESERVED BY S
80(1) OF THE PPSA?
Hamersley argued that its rights to contractual set-off was preserved by section 80(1) of the
PPSA. His Honour held, however, that Hamersley could not invoke section 80(1) to enable it
to raise set-off (other than that permitted by section 553C of the CA) in Forge’s liquidation.19
Section 80(1) of the PPSA provides that:
The rights of a transferee of an account or chattel paper (including a secured party or a
receiver) are subject to:

(a) the terms of the contract between the account debtor and the transferor, and any equity,
defence, remedy or claim arising in relation to the contract (including a defence by way
of a right of set-off); and

(b) any other equity, defence, remedy or claim of the account debtor against the transferor
(including a defence by way of a right of set-off) that accrues before the first time when
payment by an account debtor to the transferor no longer discharges the obligation of the
account debtor under subsection (8) to the extent of the payment. (underline added)

This raised an issue as to whether Forge’s claims constituted accounts transferred to ANZ. 20
Section 10 of the PPSA defined ‘Account’ as follows:
account means a monetary obligation (whether or not earned by performance, and, if payable
in Australia, whether or not the person who owes the money is located in Australia) that arises
from:
(a) disposing of property (whether by sale, transfer, assignment, lease, licence or in any other
way); or
(b) granting a right, or providing services, in the ordinary course of a business of granting
rights or providing services of that kind (whether or not the account debtor is the person
to whom the right is granted or the services are provided);
but does not include any of the following:
(c) an ADI account;
(d) chattel paper;
(e) an intermediated security;
(f) an investment instrument;
(g) a negotiable instrument.
19Ibid [222].
20Ibid [240].
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His Honour held that a ‘monetary obligation’, in the context of the definition above, is
an existing legal obligation on one party to pay an identifiable monetary sum to another on an
ascertainable date arising from the disposing of property or the granting of a right or providing services
in the ordinary course of granting rights or providing services of that kind subject to the specified
exceptions.21

Justice Tottle stated that:
… a claim for payment for services provided pursuant to an agreement is capable of constituting a
monetary obligation provided that the agreement contains a mechanism for ascertaining the amount to
be paid and the payment date. If there is a legally enforceable obligation and a corresponding existing
liability to make payment then it is immaterial that enforcement by court proceedings is required or that
a court is required to resolve a dispute as to the amount to be paid or the payment date. Contractual
claims of this nature may be contrasted with a right to claim damages in tort or equity, which the court
in Strategic Finance held did not constitute monetary obligations. In the case of a right to claim
damages in tort or equity a legally enforceable obligation and corresponding liability does not arise
until judgment. By way of contrast, a legally enforceable contractual obligation and corresponding
liability arises when there is performance in accordance with the terms of the contract.22

Forge’s claims against Hamersley were broadly categorised as claims for amounts certified
for payment (Payment Certificate Claims), progress claims, and claims arising from
securities it says were wrongfully drawn down by Hamersley (Securities Claims). Forge
conceded that the Payment Certificate Claims were accounts.

23

His Honour held that the

progress claims were also accounts for the purposes of the PPSA but that the Securities
Claims were not.24
His Honour stated that the purpose of section 80(1) of the PPSA was to protect account
debtors who would otherwise be disadvantaged by the transfer of accounts in which they
have an interest.25 Justice Tottle held that there was no basis for concluding that Parliament
intended section 80(1) of the PPSA to amend the statutory regime for mutual credit and set-

21Ibid [260] (emphasis added).
22Ibid [261].
23Ibid [263].
24Ibid [265], [266].
25Ibid [219]-[221].
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off in liquidation set out in section 553C of the CA.26 Further, as Hamersley’s rights were to
be determined within the context of Forge’s liquidation, they had to be determined by
reference to the statutory provisions set out in the CA.27 Accordingly, section 80(1) of the
PPSA did not preserve Hamersley’s right to contractual and equitable set-off.

IV IF THE RIGHTS TO SET-OFF ARE PRESERVED BY S 80(1), DOES THAT GIVE RISE TO AN
INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN S 80(1) OF THE PPSA AND SECTION 553C OF THE CORPORATIONS
ACT TO WHICH SECTION 258 OF THE PPPSA APPLIES, WITH THE RESULT THAT S 553C
PREVAILS?
His Honour also dealt with Forge’s argument that even if section 80(1) of the PPSA preserved
Hamersley’s rights, to the extent to which section 80 is construed as having the effect of
permitting an account debtor to raise a contractual set-off against a company in liquidation, it
is inconsistent with section 553C and, by reason of the operation of section 258 of the PPSA,
it would not have that effect. 28 Section 258 of the PPSA provides as follows (emphasis
added):
(1) This Act (apart from Division 4), or any instrument made under this Act, does not have an effect
covered by subsection (2) to the extent to which that effect would give rise (apart from this subsection)
to a direct inconsistency between this Act, or the instrument, and a law covered by subsection (3)…
The following effects of a law are covered by this subsection:
(a) prohibiting or limiting a person creating, acquiring or dealing with personal property or a security
interest in personal property;
(b) without limiting paragraph (a):
(i)
prohibiting or limiting the right of a person to hold, transfer or assign a security interest in
(ii)

personal property; or
imposing limitations or additional obligations or requirements in relation to the

enforcement of a security interest in personal property.
(2) The following laws are covered by this subsection:
(a) a law of the Commonwealth (other than this Act, or an instrument made under this Act);
(b) a law of a referring State (while the State is a referring State);
(c) a law of a Territory;
(d) the general law.

…
26Ibid [222]-[223].
27Ibid [222], [224].
28Ibid [227].
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His Honour held that section 258 did not apply in the circumstances. While section 80(1) had
the effect of the nature covered by section 258(2), section 553C did not. 29 Since the effect of
section 553C is confined to the determination of the debts and claims of a person proving
within a liquidation, it does not have an effect in relation to the enforcement of a security
interest in personal property. The enforcement of security interest takes place outside the
liquidation.30 In any event, his Honour had held that section 80(1) of the PPSA did not
preserve Hamersley’s rights, that section 553C of the CA established an exclusive code, and
that there could be no reliance outside of the code on other forms of set-off.31
Accordingly, the only right to set-off which may have been available to Hamersley would
have had to come from the operation of section 553C of the CA.

V SECTION 553C OF THE CA AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR MUTUALITY OF INTEREST
It was common ground that for section 553C of the CA to operate, there must be mutuality of
interest between the parties.32 The rationale underpinning the mutuality principle is that one
person’s money should not be used to pay another’s debts.33 The proposition advanced against
Hamersley was that ANZ’s money (derived from Forge’s claims against Hamersley and
advanced in Forge’s name on behalf of ANZ) should not be used to satisfy Forge’s debts to
Hamersley by allowing Hamersley to set-off those debts against the claims advanced in
Forge’s name for ANZ’s benefit.34 It was, therefore, necessary to consider the nature of
ANZ’s interest in Forge’s claims.
Prior to the PPSA, there was a distinction between fixed charges and floating charges. His
Honour quoted from Lord Scott’s judgment in Re Spectrum Plus Ltd (in liq) 2 AC 680 at
[111]:
29Ibid [236]-[239].
30Ibid [238].
31Ibid [240].
32Ibid [289].
33Ibid [394].
34Ibid [293].
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[T]he essential characteristic of a floating charge, the characteristic that distinguishes it from
a fixed charge, is that the asset subject to the charge is not finally appropriated as a security
for the payment of the debt until the occurrence of some future event. In the meantime the
chargor is left free to use the charged asset and to remove it from the security. 35

Attachment and crystallisation have established meanings in the context of fixed and floating
charges.36 When a floating charge crystallises, the floating charge attaches to the collateral
and the ability of the chargor to trade and manage the assets constituting security ends. 37 Prior
to crystallisation, however, the existence of a floating charge had no effect upon the rights of
set-off accruing to the debtor of the company. This was because the law recognised that it was
unfair to trade creditors to allow a chargor to trade freely yet remain immune from the normal
incidents of legal process.38
Justice Tottle rejected Hamersley’s submission that section 8(1) of the PPSA insulated set-off
rights from the changes brought about by the PPSA.39 His Honour held that the role of section
8(1) is a limited one, that is, it excludes the stipulated interests from the operation of the
PPSA and exempted those who holding such interests from the need to comply with the
provisions of the PPSA. Further, his Honour held that the contractual set-off provisions did
not operate as a netting-off provision. Accordingly, Hamersley’s argument that there were no
monies due to Forge capable of forming part of the collateral also failed. 40 That is, the
condition in section 19(2)(a) of the PPSA that the grantor has rights in the collateral was
satisfied.
His Honour held that attachment rule in section 19 of the PPSA operated in such a way that
mutuality of interest between Forge’s claims and Hamersley’s claims ceased to exist because:

35Ibid [298].
36Ibid [301].
37Ibid [302].
38Ibid [303].
39Ibid [304].
40Ibid [307].
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(a) the attachment rule operates to confer on the secured party a proprietary interest in the
collateral upon satisfaction of the conditions in section 19(2) and not at a later time
(ANZ and Forge had not agreed that attachment would take place at a later time);41
(b) as such, the pre-PPSA concept of crystallisation and the floating charge as a device for
taking security over personal property had been rendered redundant by the PPSA;42
(c) the security agreement provided that the security interest granted to ANZ was by way
of a charge over all collateral (other than revolving assets) and accordingly, the charge
had attached by reason of the operation of section 19(2) and conferred on ANZ an
equitable and proprietary interest in Forge’s claims;43
(d) a statutory proprietary interest of the nature conferred by a security interest under the
PPSA was sufficient to destroy mutuality of interest for the purposes of set-off;44 and
(e) in light of the changes brought about by the PPSA, Hamersley’s argument failed
because the secured party acquires a proprietary interest in the collateral before the
occurrence of a ‘crystallising’ event.45
In short, on attachment, ANZ acquired a proprietary interest in Forge’s claims and this
ended the mutuality of interest between Hamersley’s claims and Forge’s claims and
therefore, section 553C did not apply.

VI CONCLUSION
This case illustrates the fundamental changes that the PPSA has made in respect of
security interests. Such changes have significant repercussions for parties contracting
with a chargor under the PPSA. As Justice Tottle noted:
Hamersley’s submission draws attention to the potential injustice to a trade creditor/account
debtor who may be deprived of set-off rights by a company granting a security interest over
its accounts. Under the pre-PPSA law, courts were astute to avoid this potential justice by
construing those charges which conferred a trading power on chargors as floating charges
41Ibid [313], [396].
42Ibid [314], [323]-[334].
43Ibid [315], [336].
44Ibid [394].
45Ibid [396].
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with the result that the chargees’ proprietary interest in collateral did not arise until
crystallisation and thus mutuality of interest was preserved for set-off purposes. Under the
PPSA regime, this potential injustice is ameliorated by s 80(1) of the PPSA, albeit subject to
the limitation which I have referred earlier in these reasons. Whether the protection afforded
to account debtors by s 80(1) is adequate may well be a matter for debate. 46

46Ibid [397].
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